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Notes
LANDLORD AND TENANT-NEW REMEDIES
FOR OLD PROBLEMS
In Marini v. ITeland, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that in a lease of residential property to be used for a dwelling,
the landlord should be held to an implied covenant of fitness for
the purpose of the lease.' That is, the landlord must warrant that
the dwelling is fit for habitation. Upon a breach of this cove-
nant, and after notice to the landlord, the tenant may repair the
premises himself and deduct the cost of the repairs from his rent.
2
On April 2, 1969, plaintiff landlord and defendant tenant en-
tered into a one year lease for an apartment dwelling in Camden,
New Jersey. While the lease contained a covenant of quiet enjoy-
ment, it did not contain an express covenant to repair. In June
the defendant discovered that her toilet was cracked, leaking and
discharging water onto the bathroom floor. After repeated but
fruitless attempts to inform the landlord of this condition, the de-
fendant hired a plumber who repaired the toilet. On July 15 the
defendant sent the landlord the plumber's receipt and $9.28, the
difference between the cost of repairs and the rent due. The plain-
tiff challenged the offset and demanded the balance of the rent
due.
When his demand was refused, plaintiff filed suit in the county
court alleging that since he was entitled to the rent and was un-
der no duty to repair, the offset should not be allowed. The court,




ruling that the issue was a matter of law, entered a judgment
of possession for the plaintiff. Defendant appealed. The Appel-
late Division granted a stay of judgment and warrant of eviction
pending appeal. Before the Appellate Division could hear argu-
ments, the Supreme Court certified the case on its own motion.
The reasoning revealed three major issues in the case. The
first was a jurisdictional question, basically a local issue and not
within the purview of this Note. The other two closely-related
issues were: (1) did the landlord have a duty to repair; and (2)
upon a breach of that duty did the tenant have the right to repair
the property himself and deduct the cost of such repairs from his
rent?
The general rule is that in the absence of statute or an express
covenant by the landlord to the contrary, the lessor is under no
duty to repair the leased property.3 The landlord is bound by no
implied covenant to repair during the term of the lease,4 even
if the premises are in a dangerous condition.5 The doctrine of
caveat emptor governs leases and bailments,6 with only four excep-
tions:7 first, where the leasehold is to be used for a public pur-
pose;8 second, where the lessor retains possession of public areas
(stairways, halls, etc.);9 third, where a dangerous defect is known
to the lessor but difficult for the lessee to discover; 10 and fourth,
where an express covenant to repair is made a part of the lease.11
3. Farber v. Greenberg, 98 Cal. App. 675, 277 P. 534 (1929); Pig-
natario v. Meyers, 100 Conn. 234, 123 A. 263 (1924); Old Time Pet-
roleum Co. v. Tureol, 18 Del. 121, 156 A. 501 (1931); Bailey v. First Realty
Co., 305 Mass. 306, 25 N.E.2d 712 (1940); Lipsitz v. Schechter, 377 Mich.
685, 142 N.W.2d 1 (1966); Bauer v. 141-149 Cedar Lane Holding Co., 24
N.J. 139, 130 A.2d 833 (1957); Altz v. Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703
(1922); Rotte v. Meierjohan, 78 Ohio App. 387, 70 N.E.2d 684 (1946);
Lopez v. Quakcenback, 391 Pa. 359, 137 A.2d 771 (1958).
4. Rathburn Co. v. Simmons, 90 Cal. App. 692, 266 P. 369 (D.C. 3rd
1928); Woodcock v. Pope, 164 Md. 165, 140 A. 76 (App. Ct. 1928); Rosen-
berg v. Krinick, 116 N.J.L. 587, 186 A. 446 (1936); Potter v. N.Y. O&W
R.R. Co., 233 App. Div. 578, 253 N.Y.S. 394, aff'd, 261 N.Y. 489, 185 N.E.
708 (1933); Irish v. Rosenbaum, 348 Pa. 194, 34 A.2d 486 (1943).
5. Casais v. Meyer L. Shapiro Estate, 136 N.J.L. 304, 55 A.2d 819
(1947), aff'd., 137 N.J.L. 608, 61 A.2d 238 (1948).
6. Lusco v. Jackson, 27 Ala. App. 531, 175 So. 566 (1937); Borden
v. Hirsh, 249 Mass. 205, 143 N.E. 912, 33 A.L.R. 526 (1924).
7. 21 BAYLOR L. REV. 326, 1969.
8. Perez v. Raybauld, 76 Tex. 191, 13 S.W. 177 (1890).
9. Fergusen v. National Bank of Commerce, 174 S.W.2d 1015 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1943).
10. Burton-Lingo Co. v. Morton, 136 Tex. 263, 126 S.W.2d 727 (1939).
11. F.H. Vohlsing Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 108 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1937).
In Marini, the court found a duty to repair existing outside
of the usual exceptions. There was no expressed covenant to re-
pair; the leaking toilet was hardly a dangerous or concealed de-
fect; nor was it part of a public area. The Marini court arrived at
its holding via a more novel route.
The court first recognized that the old caveat emptor approach
to leases was outmoded. 12 Although that approach was logically
pertinent to land transactions in a rural, agrarian society, it had
lagged far behind the changes brought about by industrialization
and urbanization and ignored economic realities. Large scale ur-
banization, coupled with a severe housing shortage, has resulted in
housing becoming a seller's (lessor's) market, with a resulting
inequality of the bargaining position between lessors and lessees.13
The lessee rarely has as much knowledge of the true condition
of the premises as the lessor."4 Many defects, among them quite
probably the toilet in the Marini case, are not readily visible and
arise after the signing of the lease, or occur through normal use
during the term of the lease. The landlord is in a better position
to discover latent or structural defects than the tenant, who rarely
has the expertise to realize the implications of a defect, should
he be so fortunate as to discover one.1'5 A tenant, for example,
would probably not know if the plumbing and wiring conformed
to local codes. 16 Nor, as the Marini court stated, should the tenant
be required to hire an expert to inform him of the condition of a
prospective rental.1'7
These factors, Marini stated, are persuasive arguments for
abandoning the caveat emptor doctrine with respect to leases and
adopting "an implied warranty that the premises are suitable for
the leased purposes and conform to local codes and zoning laws."' 8
The court held that such a covenant must arise in a lease because it
is indispensable to effect the purpose of the lease. 19 Since in this
case the lease was for a dwelling:
The effect which the parties, as fair and reasonable
men, presumably would have agreed upon was that the
premises were habitable and fit for living. The very ob-
12. Marini v. Ireland, 50 N.J. 130, 135, 265 A.2d at 532, citing
Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 140 A.2d 199 (1958).
13. Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
As a result of the recognition of the problem by state legislatures, a grow-
ing number of "multiple dwelling" statutes have been enacted. See, e.g.,
N.J.S. 55: 13A-l, et. seq. and regulations thereunder. See also, CONN.
GEN. STAT. Tit. IV, § 19-347b (1965); ILL. STAT. ANN., Tit. 24, § 11-31-2
(1961); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN., § 125.534(5) (Supp. 1965); N.Y. MULTI-
PLE DWELLING LAW, § 302-a (McKinney, 1965).








ject of the letting was to furnish the defendant with
quarters suitable for living purposes.
20
The Marini court held that since the express purpose of the lease
was to furnish a dwelling, 21 the landlord should warrant the prem-
ises to be suitable for that purpose, even though no express
warranty was given.22 The court concluded that this-warranty of
habitability was really a semantic camouflage for an implied
warranty to repair."2
Although the court's reasoning is not clear, it apparently held
that the warranty of habitability was a continuing one which ex-
isted for the term of the lease. Thus, since normal wear and tear
will reasonably occur during the course of a year, a covenant to
repair necessarily arises in order to keep the leased property suit-
able for the purpose for which it was leased.
Having found that an implied covenant to repair existed in
the Marini lease, the court then found it necessary to discuss the
respective rights and duties which arose from such a covenant.
The court recognized that historically, under the law of real prop-
erty, when a landlord failed to perform a covenant the tenant
could not deduct any resultant loss from his rent, but had to sue
for breach of the covenant. 24 More recently, however, the land-
lord's covenants and the tenants covenants (most importantly, the
covenant to pay rent) have been weighed together, according to
the manifest intentions of the parties, to ascertain whether they
are "mutual covenants," with a breach by one party relieving the
other of the duty to perform. 25 This view marks a trend toward
a contract theory interpretation of leases and departs from the
older real property view. The breach by a landlord of a covenant
found to be mutual with the tenant's covenant to pay rent would
release the tenant from the covenant. Thus the tenant, in effect
20. Id.
21. The purpose of the lease (i.e., to be used as a dwelling) was ex-
pressly stated in the lease.
22. 50 N.J. 130, 133, 265 A.2d at 531.
23. Id. at 136, 265 A.2d at 534.
24. Marini v. Ireland, 50 N.J. 130, 136, 265 A.2d at 534. See also,
Duncan Land Development Co. v. Duncan Hardware, Inc., 34 N.J. Super.
293, 112 A.2d 274 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 19 N.J. 328, 116 A.2d 829
(1955); Stewart v. Childs Co., 86 N.J.L. 648, 92 A.2d 392 (Ct. of App.
1914).
25. Higgins v. Whiting, 102 N.J.L. 279, 131 A. 879 (Supp. Ct. 1925);
56-70 58th St. Holding Co. v. Fedders-Quigan Corp., 5 N.Y.2d 557, 159
N.E.2d 150 (1959); Enos v. Foster, 155 Cal. App. 2d 152, 317 P.2d 670
(1957); Cragmere Holding Corp. v. Socony-Mobil Oil Co., 65 N.J. Super.
322, 167 A.2d 825 (App. Div. 1961); See also, 3 Thompson Real Property,
§ 1115 (1959 Replacement).
claiming a constructive eviction based on the landlord's breach of
contract, would have the right to remove himself from the prem-
ises and stop paying rent.26 Since the Marini court held that an
implied covenant to repair existed in order to perpetually ful-
fill the implied warranty of habitability, and that this covenant
was "mutual" with the tenant's covenant to pay rent, the breach
of the covenant by the landlord gave the tenant the right to cancel
the lease and vacate.
27
For Mrs. Ireland, however, the problem was more complex.
Although as the tenant she was released from her obligation to
pay rent by the landlord's breach of his covenant, she could not
remain in the apartment without paying rent. She simply had the
option either to pay the rent or not to pay the rent and vacate the
premises. As the Marini court stated, this was not a satisfactory
remedy.28 Vacation during the term of the lease is a drastic and
dangerous step. If the tenant is wrong and a court, in a suit by
the landlord to recover unpaid rent, should decide that the land-
lord's breach was not serious enough to warrant a constructive
eviction (in other words, the covenant breached was not "mutual"
with the covenant to pay rent) a substantial liability could be im-
posed on the tenant to pay the rent for the balance of the term. 29
More importantly, however, the court in Marini acknowledged
the effect of the present housing shortage. A mere right to vacate
leaves an aggrieved tenant with two equally distasteful choices:
(1) vacate and face the possibility of not being able to relocate
satisfactorily or (2) assume responsibility for the repairs himself.
The first alternative is rendered even less acceptable by the gen-
eral rule that a tenant's right to vacate under a constructive evic-
tion is lost if not exercised within a reasonable time.3 0 Thus, a
tenant cannot take the time to search for a new residence before
vacating without the risk of losing his right to vacate.
Recognizing the deficiencies in the right-to-vacate remedy,
the Marini court held that, upon a constructive eviction due to
26. Stevenson Stanoyevich Fund v. Steinacher, 125 N.J.L. 326,
15 A.2d 772 (Supp. Ct. 1940); McGurdy v. Wychoff, 73 N.J.L. 368, 63 A.
992 (Supp. Ct. 1906); Weiler v. Pancoast, 71 N.J.L. 414, 58 A. 1084 (Supp.
Ct. 1904). Acc'd., Richards v. Dodge, 150 So. 2d 477 (Fla. D.C. App. 1963);
Ira Handleman Bldg. Corp. v. Dolan, 15 Ill. 49, 145 N.E.2d 250 (App. Ct.
1957); Weiss v. I. Zapinski, Inc., 65 N.J.S. 351, 167 A.2d 802 (Supp. Ct.
1961); Bronx Garment Center, Inc. v. Acme Multi-Stiching Corp., 37
Misc. 2d 994, 235 N.Y.S. 123 (N.Y. City Civil Ct. 1962).
27. Overstreet v. Rhodes, 212 Ga. 521, 93 S.E.2d 715 (1956); Sewell
v. Hukill, 128 Mont. 232, 356 P.2d 339 (1960). See also, Schaaf v. Mort-
man, 19 Wis. 2d 540, 120 N.W.2d 654 (1963); Reste Realty Co. v.
Cooper, 53 N.J. 462, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
28. 50 N.J. 130, 136, 265 A.2d at 535.
29. Reste Realty Co. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 462, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
30. Weiss v. Zapinski Inc., 65 N.J. Super. 351, 167 A.2d 802 (App.
Div. 1961); Duncan Development Co. v. Duncan Hardware Inc., 34 N.J.
Super. 293, 112 A.2d 274 (App. Div. 1955).
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failure to repair, a tenant, besides having his right to vacate,
should have the alternative remedy of removing the grounds for
the constructive eviction. That is, he should have the right to
repair the premises himself, accompanied by the right to offset the
cost of such repairs from his rent.31 However, the court placed
some limitations on the tenant's right to exercise this alternative:
the damage which the tenant wishes to repair must have been
caused through normal wear; 2 the tenant's recourse to such self-
help must be preceded by timely notice to the landlord of the
faulty condition; 33 and finally, the condition of which the tenant
is complaining must be such that it affects facilities vital to the
use of the premises as a residence (that is, it must render the prop-
erty "uninhabitable or unlivable").34 The court further warned
that its holding did not mean that the tenant is relieved from
paying rent as long as the landlord fails to repair.35 The aggrieved
tenant in New Jersey now simply has an alternative to vacation un-
der a constructive eviction. Moreover, the court stated that if a
trial upon this issue is delayed, the tenant may be required to
post a bond to protect the landlord's interest should he prevail.86
This bond requirement, however, rests upon the court's discre-
tion.
37
The Marini decision is a clear break with the prior law in this
area. In New Jersey, the law had been that a tenant for years made
repairs at his own risk; that is, the landlord, in the absence of an
express covenant to repair, was under no duty to repair or to
pay for his tenant's repairs. 38 In other jurisdictions the com-
mon law rule prevails that there is no implied covenant that
the lessor must repair during the term,3 9 even if the defects are
31. 50 N.J. 130, 136, 265 A.2d at 535.
32. Id. at 136, 265 A.2d at 535. Where the damage is caused de-
liberately, maliciously or through abnormal use the tenant is conversely
liable.
33. Id. If the tenant is unable to give notice to the landlord after
reasonable attempts, he may repair regardless of the landlord's ignorance.




38. Patton v. Texas Co., 13 N.L. Super. 42, 80 A.2d 231 (App. Div.
1951); Daniels v. Brunton, 9 N.J. Super. 294, 76 A.2d 73 (App. Div. 1950);
Grugan v. Shore Hotels Finance and Exchange Corp., 126 N.J.L. 257,
18 A.2d 29 (Ct. App. 1941); Harrenberg v. August, 119 N.J.L. 831, 194 A.
152 (Ct. App. 1937); Briggs v. Pannaci, 106 N.J.L. 541, 150 A. 427 (Ct.
App. 1930).
39. Rathburn v. Simmons, 90 Cal. App. 692, 226 P. 369 (D.C. App. 3rd
1928); Lesser v. Kline, 101 Conn. 740, 127 A. 279 (1925); Potter v. N.Y.
dangerous or existed before the demise. 40  Although in some ju-
risdictions landlords are required to repair by statute, 41 these
statutes are somewhat rare and are usually restricted to specific
types of repairs, usually of conditions which violate fire or build-
ing codes.42 Furthermore, in light of the strong majority com-
mon law rule of non-liability of landlords to repair, the statutes are
usually construed strictly and often in favor of the landlord.
43
Since there is no common law duty to repair, there is, of
course, no rule permitting a tenant to repair himself and subtract
the cost of such repairs from his rent. Such a self-help device
seems to be law only in New Jersey. The rent withholding de-
vice, however, as an alternative to vacation upon a constructive
eviction, is gaining favor particularly in urban states where it is
most needed. This trend is reflected in several recent statutes.
44
Generally referred to as "rent withholding acts," they actually fall
into three types: (1) rent withholding statutes, which usually
provide an escrow account for the collection of rent during the
dispute,45 (2) rent abatement statutes, which suspend the collec-
tion of rent by the landlord; 46 and (3) repair-deduction statutes,
where the cost of repairs can be deducted from the rent due.
47
Although a comparison of these statutes with the New Jersey
Marini rule is outside the scope of this Note, it should be pointed
out that most of the statutory procedures are much more cum-
bersome than the New Jersey rule. The Michigan repair-deduc-
tion statute, for example, requires effective notice to be given to
the landlord before the tenant begins to repair (New Jersey only
requires that the tenant reasonably try to contact the landlord)
and that a receiver be appointed to hold the rent in escrow until
some settlement is reached.
48
It is submitted, however, that the Marini holding is not with-
out shortcomings of its own. It has created some difficulties which
the courts will have to deal with in the near future. The holding
is actually two-fold: Under Marini the landlord is not only held to
a covenant to keep the premises in a useable condition-that is to
repair them when defects appear through normal use-but he is
O&W R.R. Co., 233 App. Div. 578, 253 N.Y.S. 394 (1931); Irish v. Rosen-
baum Co. v. Pittsburgh, 348 Pa. 194, 34 A.2d 486 (1943); Yarbrough v.
Booker, 141 Tex. 420, 174 S.W.2d 47 (1943).
40. Plaza Amusement Co. v. Rothenberg, 159 Miss. 800, 131 So. 350
(1947); Casais v. Meyer L. Shapiro Estate, 136 N.J.L. 304, 55 A.2d 819
(1947), aff'd, 137 N.J.L. 608, 61 A.2d 238 (1948).
41. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 41 § 31, 32 (Supp. 1968).
42. Gordon v. Reinheimer, 167 Okla. 343, 29 P.2d 596 (1934).
43. Callahan v. Loughran, 102 Cal. 476, 36 P. 835 (1894).
44. CONN. GEN. STAT., Tit. IV, § 19-347(b) (1965); ILL. STAT. ANN.
Tit. 24, § 11-31-2 (1961); MiCH. COMP. LAWS ANN., § 125-530 (Supp. 1969);
PA. STAr. ANN., Tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1969).
45. CONN. GEN. STAT., Tit. IV, §§ 19-347 (b) (1965).
46. N.Y. MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW, § 302-a (McKinney 1965).




also required to warrant that the premises are free from latent
defects in facilities which are vital to the purpose of the letting.49
The use of the term "latent" raises some interesting questions.
For instance, does this mean that the landlord's warranty does not
cover obvious defects? If so, how obvious must the defects be in
order not to be under the warranty? To what standard of in-
spection would a prospective tenant be held? Because of the hous-
ing shortage many landlords have developed a take-it-or-leave-it
attitude toward prospective lessees. Under Marini a landlord could
theoretically point out all latent defects to a prospective tenant,
thus escaping the Marini warranty, and still be reasonably as-
sured that the tenant will have to rent the premises out of des-
peration. Further questions arise as to the repair and offset rem-
edy proffered in Marini. Since the case restricts the self-help rem-
edy to conditions which render a residence uninhabitable, most
of the defects likely to result in this condition would be major
and costly to repair. The offset remedy, however, is far more
satisfactory for effecting small repairs. Major defects may mean
that the cost of repair is higher than a month's rent. The cost
conceivably may even be higher than the amount of rent due for
the term of the lease. Would this mean that the tenant is left
with only the remedy of vacation under a constructive eviction?
In an answer to some of these questions, another case should
be discussed which has taken a slightly different approach to the
problem of repairing defective conditions. In Javins v. First Na-
tional Realty Corp.,'0 the United States Court of Appeals, Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, also found an implied warranty of habit-
ability in leases of urban dwelling units. In that case the land-
lord was seeking possession of his premises on the ground that
the tenants had defaulted in their rent payments. The tenants
admitted that they had not paid the rent but alleged some 1500
violations of the Housing Regulations of the District of Colum-
bia, which they claimed entitled them to an "equitable defense or a
claim by way of recoupment or setoff in an amount equal to the
rent claim." 51 The Court of General Sessions refused the tenant's
offer of proof of the violations and entered judgment for the land-
lord. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed, and the
Circuit Court granted the tenant's petition for leave to appeal.
5 2
The court in Javins, as in Marini, recognized the inadequacies
49, 50 N.J. 130, 136, 265 A.2d at 534.
50. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Circuit 1970).
51. Id. at 1073.
52, Id.
of the law of real property to deal with modem urban landlord
and tenant problems.5 3 Landlord and tenant law, derived prin-
cipally from feudal property law, historically considered a lease to
be the conveyance of an interest in land. This body of law, the
Javins court reasoned, may have been practical in an agrarian so-
ciety where the value of the lease to the tenant was the land it-
self.54 However, the value of a lease to an urban apartment
dweller is not the use of the land, but rather its value as a place
to live. The court stated:
When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek
"shelter" today, they seek a well known package of goods
and services-a package which includes not merely walls
and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation,
serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors,
proper sanitation, and proper maintenance.
55
The circuit court noted with approval the trend toward interpret-
ing leases under a contract approach rather than a real property
view. Using this technique, the results reached in lease disputes
would, the court held, be more in accord with the expectations of
the parties.50 Javins thus held that leases of urban dwelling units
should be construed like any other contract.57
The Javins court based its holding in part on analogies
drawn from recent developments in other areas of the law. The
court noted, for example, the extension of the implied warranties
of sales law to other situations such as the renting of a chattel,
payment for services, or the buying of a combination of goods and
services; that is, all transactions where the buyer must rely on the
skill and honesty of the merchant. 8 The same reliance is pres-
ent in the letting of urban dwelling units. Other examples stated
were the elimination of privity in products liability cases, the
holding of builders of new houses liable for faulty construction on
the theory of a breach of an implied warranty of fitness, and hold-
ings by at least two state supreme courts (New Jersey and Ha-
waii) finding implied warranties of quality in leases. 9 Recogniz-
ing such warranties of merchantability and fitness inherent in
other contracts, the court reasoned that the same warranties
should be extended to leases in the form of an implied warranty
of habitability. 60
53. Id. at 1074.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Javins v. First Nat'l. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1075 citing:
Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton and Coaverse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 132 P.2d
457 (1942); See also, The California Lease-Contract or Conveyance, 4
STAN. L. REV. 244 (1952); Friedman, The Nature of a Lease in New York,
33 CoaN. L.Q. 165 (1947).
57. Javins v. First Nat'l. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1075.
58. Id. at 1076.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1077.
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Finally, Javins cited a host of legal-sociological reasons for
finding an implied warranty of habitability to exist in leases, in-
cluding: the mobility of modern tenants which makes tenant re-
pairs infeasible, the difficulty for tenants of procuring financing
for such repairs, the inequality of the bargaining position between
the tenant and the landlord because of the current housing short-
age, impediments to competition in the renting market because of
such factors as racial discrimination and standard form leases
which result in landlords placing the tenant in a take-it-or-leave-
it position, and finally the undesirable impact of bad housing on
the whole society.61
Having thus decided that a contract theory approach was best
suited to lease problems, and holding that an implied warranty of
habitability is inherent in leases, the Javins court then faced the
problem of determining what conditions would be considered a
breach of the implied warranty. The court first noted that the
District's housing code itself required compliance with its require-
ments in the leases of all housing covered! 2 In Kanelos v. Ket-
tler, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had held
that the housing code imposed maintenance obligations on land-
lords which they could not ignore. 3 Further effect was given to
that case in Brown v. Southall Realty Co.6  In that case, the
landlord knew at the signing of the lease of certain housing code
violations which rendered the premises uninhabitable. The court,
using the contract theory approach, held the lease void as an
illegal contract. 5 The Brown court, however, did not reach
the precise question in Javins for two reasons. First, in Brown,
the violations existed and were known to exist (by the landlord)
before the signing of the lease. Second, the Brown holding is not
based on a breach of an implied warranty of habitability but
rather on a violation by the landlord of a section of the housing
code which forbids the letting of premises with known defects
which render it uninhabitable.66 Javins met the first problem
by holding that it is unreasonable to hold that the housing code
was meant to have effect only before the signing of the lease.67
The housing code should be interpreted as imposing continuing
61. Id. at 1079, 1080.
62. 2 D.C. Register 47 (1955).
63. Kanelos v. Kettler, 406 F.2d 951 (1966). See also, Whetzel v.
Jess Fisher Management Corp., 262 F.2d 943 (1960).
64. 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Javins v. First Nat'l. Realty Co., 428 F.2d at 1081.
duty on the landlord to comply with its requirements,68  and
therefore a continuing duty to repair.
The Javins court's handling of the second distinction in the
Brown case is less clear. The court recognized that official en-
forcement under the housing code has been sorely inadequate69
and that to follow the old rule of no duty to repair would, in ef-
fect, circumvent the legislative intent in enacting the housing
code. The court held, as the only practical solution to the con-
flict between the legislative intent present in the housing code
and the common law rule of no duty to repair, that the housing
regulations themselves imply a duty to warrant leased premises as
habitable as well as a duty to repair to keep the premises hab-
itable. Both duties are measured by the habitability standards set
out in the housing code. 70
In summary, Javins held: (1) A contract approach should be
used in determining the rights and duties of parties to a lease
instead of the rules of real property law; (2) An implied war-
ranty of habitability exists in leases of dwelling units; (3) This
warranty is a continuing duty which requires the landlord to re-
pair in order to maintain the premises in a habitable condition;
(4) Whether or not the premises are in a habitable condition will
be determined with reference to the housing code requirements.
It is submitted, however, that Javins, like Marini, is open to
some criticism. For instance, the court pointed out that under
contract principles as applied to a lease, the tenant's duty-to-pay
rent is conditioned upon the landlord's performance of his obliga-
tions; namely, his implied warranty to keep the premises in a
habitable condition.71 The holding, however, leaves it to the jury
to decide what portion, if any, of the rent should be suspended
upon a showing of the landlord's breach of his duty.72 That is, the
jury must determine whether the violations are serious enough
to suspend any, all, or only a portion of the rent due for the
term. Furthermore, since there is no provision in Javins for the re-
pair and offset remedy as in Marini, the tenant, after proving
a breach of the implied warranty by the landlord, is left with
only the normal contract remedies; a suit for damages, a suit for
specific performance, or recission. The problem with damages as
a remedy (besides the problem of vagueness discussed above) is
that unless the amount of damages is enough to cover the cost of
repairs, the tenant is not effectively aided. Although he is re-
lieved from his duty to pay rent, the conditions may still exist.
A suit for specific performance, to force the landlord to repair,
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1082.1
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1083.
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may be impossible because of the seemingly adequate remedy at
law. Even if the suit is possible, it means a time consuming
court fight, during which the conditions in all likelihood will
still exist. As compared with the facility of the Marini self-
help remedy, the specific performance suit seems unwieldy, al-
though it has the advantage over the Marini remedy in that it is
useful when the cost of repairs is higher than the rent due for
the term of the lease. Recission, on the other hand, is tantamount
to constructive eviction with all the attendant inadequacies.7 3
A last criticism of the Javins holding is its dependence on hous-
ing code violations to provide a basis for relief. While the court
found an implied warranty of habitability to exist, breach of this
warranty is to be measured solely by the standards of the hous-
ing code.]4 It is conceivable that conditions might exist in a
dwelling which would render it uninhabitable, while not violat-
ing the housing code and conversely that other violations of the
housing code might not significantly affect habitability. Javins
makes no provisions for remedying such a situation. Marini, by
contrast, leaves it to the jury to determine whether a condition
renders a dwelling uninhabitable. While the Marini method
might be too vague, it is more flexible. The only limitation to
the effect of Marini is that the defect be serious enough to af-
fect facilities vital to the use of the premises as a dwelling.7 5
In summary, the two cases can be compared as follows: Both
cases agree that,
(1) a contract approach rather than a real property approach
should be used in describing the rights and liabilities of ten-
ants and landlords in leases of urban dwellings;
(2) all leases contain an implied warranty of habitability;
(3) in order to honor the warranty, landlords are under a duty
to repair the premises whenever conditions arise, due to normal
wear, which make the premises uninhabitable;
(4) upon a breach of the warranty, the tenant is relieved of
his duty to pay rent (to some extent) since the covenant to pay
rent is dependent upon the landlord's performance of his implied
73. Any further comparison of the remedies in Marini as compared to
those in Javins would be of little value. The only real difference between
them is that Marini allows the repair and set-off while Javins does not.
Marini apparently does not limit its remedy to the set-off and, since the
holding used the contract approach, it can be inferred that all normal con-
tract remedies are available in Marini as well as in Javins.
74. Javins v. First Nat'l. Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1082.
75. Marini v. Ireland, 50 N.J. 130, 135, 265 A.2d at 534.
covenant to repair-the cases disagree on (1) the standard of main-
tenance required and (2) the remedies available.
In Javins, the housing code is used as the yardstick for de-
termining whether the existence of certain defects affect the hab-
itability of a unit. If a violation exists which materially lessens
the habitability of a dwelling, and the landlord fails to repair,
then the lease-contract is breached and the tenant is entitled
to the usual contract remedies. In Marini, habitability is de-
termined without reference to housing codes. The only recovery
for defects existing prior to the signing of the lease is for latent de-
fects, although there is a duty on the landlord to repair all ma-
terial defects arising after the signing of the lease whether they
are latent or not. Finally, while normal contractual remedies for
breach are apparently available (although not specifically men-
tioned), the tenant may, with certain limitations, repair the
defects himself and subtract the cost of such repairs from his rent.
In conclusion, it is submitted that while the two cases have
taken large steps in the direction of improving the lot of the ur-
ban leasee, they are only a beginning. Perhaps a synthesis of the
strong points of each case would prove more workable than the
answers presented in either case taken alone. The following is
submitted, therefore, as perhaps a better model for future case
law or statutes dealing with the subject: (1) All leases of dwellings
should be construed as contracts between the leasor and lessee,
with the usual rights and duties attendant in a contract; (2) As
in contracts for the sale of goods, contracts for leasing should be
construed to include an implied warranty that the premises are fit
for the purpose of the letting; i.e., an implied warranty of habit-
ability exists in all leases of dwelling units; (3) The implied war-
ranty of habitability is a covenant which exists for the term of
the lease, thus creating in the landlord a duty to repair when nec-
essary; (4) The warranty should cover all defects which materi-
ally affect the habitability of the premises, whether they exist be-
fore the signing of the lease or arise during the term of the lease,
and whether they are latent or obvious; (5) The habitability of the
premises should be determined by the fact-finder upon presen-
tation of all the facts without regard as to whether the defects
complained of violate the housing code, although violations of ma-
terial provisons should be prima facie evidence of breach of the
warranty; (6) The tenant's remedies upon breach of the warranty
by the landlord should be the ususal contract remedies of dam-
ages, suit for specific performance, recission (constructive evic-
tion), and, after proper notice to the landlord, repair by the tenant
with a corresponding setoff from the rent.
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